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refer to Defendant/Appellee South Jordan City herein as the "City".
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ARGUMENT
I.

Plaintiffs are Entitled to Seek Enforcement of the City's Ordinances Pursuant
to 10-9-1002
This Court has established that an action brought by a landowner to request

enforcement of a municipality's ordinances is an "enforcement" action pursuant to 10-91002 ("Section 1002"), which is not subject to the thirty (30) day limitation set forth in
10-9-1001 ("Section 1001"). Culbertson v. Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake
County, 2001 UT 108, 44 R3d 642, 652 ("Culbertson") (2001); Toone v. Weber County,
2002 UT 103, 57 P.3d 1079, 1081-82 (2002)("Toone").
To avoid the effect of this principle of law, the City has mischaracterized the
nature of Plaintiffs' case as a challenge to the process for approval of the underlying Site
Plan for the property at issue. However, the record demonstrates this is an action seeking
to compel the City of South Jordan (the "City") to comply with its mandatory ordinances,
and is therefore an "enforcement" action brought pursuant to Section 1002. See
Culbertson,ffi[29-31, 44 P.3d at 652; Toone,ffif7-10, 57 P.3d at 1081-82.
Specifically, the Plaintiffs claimed construction and use of the property at issue
(the "Property") violated city ordinances, and, because of that illegal action, the City was
required to issue a written stop order and prohibit issuance of a certificate of occupancy
until such time as the Property was brought into compliance with city ordinances. (R 68). Those claims were based on Ordinance 97-7's mandate that all property located
within the 100-year flood plain must be preserved for open space, recreation, and
preservation uses. (R 113, See Exhibit "xV in the Addendum to the Brief of Appellants).
1

When this action was filed, the developers were constructing an illegal 350-stall, concrete
parking lot designed to serve a three-story office building on the Property, which was
located almost entirely within the 100-year flood plain. (R 13, 65). Plaintiffs filed this
action seeking enforcement of Ordinance 97-7 and other city ordinances set forth below.
(R 3-8), Plaintiffs claims therefore fell within the purview of Section 1002, and were not
subject to Section 1001's limitations.
The City also has asserted the novel argument that Plaintiffs "enforcement
action" is, in fact, subject to Section 1001's limitations because it involves issues
previously considered by the City. (Brief of South Jordan City Defendants/Appellees,
("City's Brief5) 9-16) As an initial matter, this argument fails because the City
introduced no evidence before the District Court to support their allegations that the
effect of Ordinance 97-7 was considered in the Site Plan approval process. Even if such
evidence were introduced, such a holding would be directly contrary this Court's
definition of "enforcement" actions, and would impose a vague qualifier that would
render Section 1002 a nullity. As explained in further detail below, the City's arguments
are factually and legally without merit.
A.

Plaintiffs' Claims Sought Enforcement of the Citv's Mandatorv
_2

.

a

v

Ordinances
Plaintiffs filed this action seeking an Order from the District Court requiring the
City to enforce its ordinances. The ordinances at issue are mandatory, not discretionary.
(See Brief of Appellants ("Plaintiffs' Brier), 9-11, 30-32). The underlying factual basis
for Plaintiffs' claims was that the use of the Property violated Ordinance 97-7 because it
2

allowed construction of the parking lot almost entirely within the boundaries of the 100year flood plain, which Ordinance 97-7 directed must be preserved as "open space/' (R
3-8). Under the City's own definition, a parking lot is not "open space". (See Plaintiffs'
Brief, 30-31; R 254-55).
When Plaintiffs discovered this violation, they immediately requested the City
issue a written stop order, as required by Section 12.16.040 of the City Code. (R 5-8,
107, 320 (11-12)). When the City refused, the Plaintiffs requested the City convene its
Board of Adjustment to hear this dispute. (R 6, 78). The City refused to convene the
Board, and Plaintiffs filed this action seeking enforcement of the City's ordinances. (R 39, 104). It is toward the City's enforcement failures that Plaintiffs' claims are directed.
Specifically, the Plaintiffs claimed: 1) Construction of the Site Plan violated
Section 11.04.130 of the City Code, which requires that site plans, construction and
infrastructure be constructed in conformance with City ordinances (R 7); 2) The City's
failure to issue a written stop order to halt construction of the Site Plan violated Section
12.16.040 of the City Code (R 7); and 3) The City's impending issuance of a certificate
of occupancy would violate Section 12.04.170 of the City Code (R 7-8). (The relevant
provisions of the City Code are attached to the Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief as Exhibit
"C'\) Accordingly, Plaintiffs sought "enforcement of decisions made pursuant to [the
Land Use Act], i.e., zoning ordinance[s]", making this action an "enforcement" action
properly filed pursuant to Section 1002. Culbertson, Iffl 29-31, 44 P.3d at 652.

Section 1002 permits Plaintiffs "to seek enforcement of ordinances made pursuant
to the Act directly in district court without [complying with Section 1001's limitations]."
M:J S e e

also

Toone, ^ 8-10, 57 P.3d at 1082 (Noting Section 1002 provides landowners

with a '''right to institute actions based on 'violations' of the Land use Act and, tellingly,
does not contain a thirty-day limitation on such actions.") Additionally, under Utah's
liberal notice pleading standards, Plaintiffs' causes of action also include their claim that
Defendants' issuance of the building permit for the project violated the Municipality
Land Use Act ("Land Use Act"). See Jackson v. Joyner, 12 Utah 2d 410, 413, 367 P.2d
452, 454 (1961) (Holding plaintiffs stated a cause of action though they did not plead the
contents of statutes upon which they based their claim, because "all that is required in a
complaint is that it clearly affords fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim asserted
and a general indication of the type of litigation involved."); Williams v. State Farm
Insurance Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982) (Noting Utah's liberal pleading rules are
designed to afford parties "the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions
they have pertaining to their dispute."). These claims are not subject to Section 1001's
thirty (30) day limitation. Culbertson, Iffl 29-31, 44 P.3d at 652; Toone, ffi| 8-10, 57 P.3d
at 1082.
Plaintiffs' challenge was not, as the City asserts, a "collateral attack" on the Site
Plan approval process. (City's Brief, 8). Although Plaintiffs challenge involved factual
and legal issues that should have caused the City not to approve the Site Plan, there was
no evidence in the City's documents that indicated the City had ever considered the effect
4

of Ordinance 97-7 in the context of the Site Plan approval1. Rather, for the first time
before the District Court, the City asserted that the 100-year flood plain shown on the Site
Plan was actually the 500-year flood plain2. (R 207-08, 219-20). The City also argued
the 350-stall, concrete parking lot met the definition of "open space", but failed to cite
any evidence in the proceedings before the planning commission or city council that
would justify such a conclusion. (R 212-13, 320 (13-16)). If this issue had been
considered by the City in the Site Plan approval process, the City's records would have
revealed some sort of discussion regarding whether the parking lot fell within the
definition of "open space," and the City could have pointed the Court to those parts of the
record during the argument below. The City's failure to do so supports the conclusion
that Ordinance 97-7 was never considered by the City in its approval of the Site Plan.
Plaintiffs claims also raise legal issues that are separate and distinct from those
that the record indicates were considered in the Site Plan approval process. Specifically,
Plaintiffs' Complaint requires the District Court to consider whether the City Code
required the City to issue a written stop order and prohibit issuance of a certificate of

1

The only document relied upon by the City in support of their argument is the Site Plan
approval itself, which did not evidence any consideration of Ordinance 97-7, the
definition of "open space", or any consideration of restricted uses in the 100-year flood
plain. (R 204-13).
2
The Plaintiffs objected to this argument as being wholly without foundation since the
City introduced no evidence in support of their argument that the line clearly designated
as the 100-year flood plain on the City's own documents was, in fact, the 500-year flood
plain (R 226-32). To the contrary, the only evidence before the District Court
established that the 100-year flood plain marked on the Site Plan map was, in fact, a
correct depiction of the 100-year flood plan as defined on the governing documents. (R
262-83).
5

occupancy until such time as the Site Plan was brought into compliance with Ordinance
97-7. (R 3-8). There is no evidence in the record to suggest these issues were previously
considered by the City.
Rather than considering Plaintiffs' challenge, the District Court dismissed this
case for the sole reason that Plaintiffs filed this action more than thirty (30) days after the
Site Plan was approved. (R 299-304). The District Court held that Section 1001 applied,
and neither Section 1002 nor City Code 12.04.090 (making violations of the Code
continuing for each day they exist) "negate[d] the application" of Section 1001 \ (R 300,
303-04). In so doing, the District Court failed to recognize the critical distinction
between Sections 1001 and 1002, and failed to accurately characterize Plaintiffs' action
as an "enforcement" action, rather than a challenge to the Site Plan approval process.
B.

Controlling Caselaw does not Support Appellee's argument

In an attempt to distinguish this case from controlling caselaw, the City has
asserted the novel argument that Section 1001 applies to enforcement actions when they

J

It should be noted that the District Court did not, as the City alleges, hold "that under
such circumstances where a municipality has actually made a land use 'decision'
applying the requirements of its ordinances to the factual conditions which plaintiffs
assert constitute violations, § 10-9-1002 does not provide an 'alternative' remedy that
allows Plaintiffs to avoid the limitations imposed by § 10-9-1001." (City's Brief, 8).
The District Court's decision did not hinge on "such circumstances" where the City had
allegedly previously considered the "factual conditions" at issue. In the course of the
briefing and hearing below, the City failed to cite any evidence to support its argument
that the City considered Ordinance 97-7 in the Site Plan approval process. The only
evidence before the District Court was the Site Plan map illustrating the parking lot
within the 100-year flood plain. Thus, the District's Court decision was based only on a
strict interpretation of Section 1001 's limitation period, and its finding that Section 1002
and the City Code did not "negate" the application of Section 1001. (R 300, 303-04).
6

involve factual issues previously considered by the City. (City Brief, 9-15). This
argument is fundamentally flawed for two reasons. First, there is no evidence in the
record to suggest Ordinance 97-7 was ever considered in the Site Plan approval process,
and, in any event, the issues involved in this case were never decided by the City.
Second, controlling caselaw does not provide support for such a distinction.
1.

The Legal Issues before this Court have not been Considered by the
City

The City's argument that Section 1001 applies to this case is based on an
erroneous interpretation of the facts. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that
the City ever considered the effect of Ordinance 97-7 in the Site Plan approval process.
The only evidence relied upon by the City is the Site Plan map illustrating the location of
the parking lot within the 100-year flood plain. This evidence does not demonstrate that
the City considered whether or not the parking lot was permissible in that location.
Additionally, this case involves legal issues that were never considered by the
City. The District Court must decide whether the use of the Property as a parking lot
violates Ordinance 97-7, and whether the City is required to issue a written stop order and
refrain from issuing a certificate of occupancy until such time as the construction and use
of the property is brought into compliance with Ordinance 97-7. These issues require the
District Court to interpret various provisions of the City Code that were not considered by
the planning commission in the Site Plan approval process.

7

2.

There is No Support for the City's Argument that
^'Enforcement" Actions are Subject to Section lOQl's
Limitations when they Concern Factual Issues Previously
Considered by the City

There is no support for the City's assertion that some enforcement actions are
subject to Section 1001. It is well established that "enforcement actions" are not subject
to Section 1001's limitations. See Culbertson,ffif29-31, 44 P.3d at 652; Toone, Iffl 7-10,
57 P.3d at 1081-82. As mentioned above, in the last two years, this Court has clarified
that "enforcement actions" include claims to enforce a City's Ordinances, and to enforce
the Land Use Act . Id. It has not, as the City implies, distinguished between enforcement
actions that do involve factual issues previously considered by the City (which 1he City
argues would be subject to Section 1001), and enforcement actions that do not involve
factual issues previously considered by the City (which the City argues would not be
subject to Section 1001). Such a distinction would lead to a "slippery slope" in which
almost any enforcement action could be subject to Section 1001, because it could involve
factual issues already considered by the City.
Such a distinction is not supported by the case law on which the City relies. This
Court's decision in Culbertson was not based on the recognition that the "enforcement"
Most recently, this Court explained "land use decisions" include the regulation of land
use through the enactment of ordinances and regulations, and through the granting of
pemiits relating to zoning and subdivision. Toone, ^} 7-8, 57 P.3d at 1081. The Court
included the following examples of "land use decisions": administering provisions of a
zoning ordinance; recommending approval or denial of subdivision applications:
enacting zoning ordinances; granting zoning variances; enacting subdivision ordinances;
and approving subdivision applications. Id. A claim that the City is violating its
8

claims did not involve factual issues already considered by the County. (City's Brief, 1011) Rather, the Culbertson holding was based strictly on the type of action challenged^.
Because the plaintiffs challenged the City's failure to wCenforce" their ordinances, this
Court properly deemed it an "enforcement" action not subject to Section 1001's
limitations. Culbertson, ffif 29-31, 44 P.3d at 652. Thus, this Court plainly established
that actions seeking enforcement of local ordinances made pursuant to the Land Use Act
are not subject to Section 1001's limitations. Importantly, this Court did not suggest or

Ordinances by failing to issue a stop work order may not fairly be included within this
definition of a "land use decision."
5
The City has argued that "[i]n Culbertson, the essence of the Plaintiffs' claims were that
a developer was failing to comply with conditions imposed by the County" in its
approval process, which claims raised issues that were independent of decisions already
made by the County. (City's Brief, 10). The City has therefore attempted to distinguish
this Court's holding in Culbertson on the grounds that Culbertson applied only to issues
not previously addressed by the County. Contrary to the City's argument, the holding in
Culbertson was not so limited. The plaintiffs' challenge did not, as the City implies,
concern only a developer's failure to comply with County imposed conditions. Rather,
the plaintiffs in Culbertson challenged construction of a building that encroached upon
certain property, in violation of the County's ordinances. 44 P.3d at 647. Those facts
are conspicuously in accord with the facts at issue in the instant case. In considering
whether Section 1001 prevented the court from considering the plaintiffs' case (for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies), the Court gave a straightforward analysis of
the distinction between challenges to land use decisions and enforcement actions. It
explained that "[pjlaintiffs do not challenge any decisions made under the Land Use act,
but instead seek enforcement of decisions made pursuant to it, i.e., zoning ordinance and
the [conditional use permit]. Enforcement of the act and ordinances made pursuant to it
is addressed in Section 1002." Id. at 652 (emphasis in original). Construing Section
1002, the Court explained the plaintiffs "are permitted to seek enforcement of
ordinances made pursuant to the Act directly in district court" without complying with
Section 1001's limitations. Id.

9

imply that its holding applied only to those enforcement actions which involve factual
issues not previously considered by local governments.
Similarly, in Toone, this Court clarified that Section 100Ts thirty (30) day
limitation does not apply "where a party seeks relief from a county's violation of the
[Land Use Act] . . . .In such instances, a party may bring an action under the next
following section, [Section 1002], which provides county land owners with the right to
institute actions based on 'violations' of the Act and, tellingly, does not contain a thirtyday limitation on such actions." Toone, *f 9, 57 P.3d at 1082. In that case as well, the
Court did not state or imply that a party may only bring an action under Section 1002 if
the "violations" complained of do not concern issues already considered by the County.
The City's reliance on Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 15 Utah 2d 305, 392
P.2d 40 (Utah 1964)("Lund"), Merrihew v. Salt Lake Planning & Zoning Comm'n., 659
P.2d 1065 (Utah 1983)("Merrihew"), and Bennion v. Sundance Dev. Corp., 897 P.2d
1232 (Utah App. 1995)("Bennion") in support of its argument is misplaced. Importantly,
those cases were decided before Culbertson and Toone and therefore are superceded to
the extent they conflict with the more recent decisions. Those cases are also
distinguishable from the instant case because they concerned appeals of land use
decisions or decisions administering the local ordinances, rather than a challenge to a
City's failure to enforce its own ordinances.
In Bennion, the plaintiff alleged that the County's approval of a plat violated the
applicable zoning ordinances. 897 P.2d at 1233. The plaintiffs challenge was therefore
10

to a uland use decision," as opposed to a city's failure to enforce it's own ordinance. In
Lund, the plaintiff tried to challenge approval of a building permit, also a "land use
decision," months after it was issued without exhausting administrative remedies. 392
P.2d at 42. In Merrihew, the plaintiff appealed a denial of a building pemiit. 659 P.2d at
1067. Additionally, the Court's decisions in Lund and Merrihew were decided under a
different statute, and therefore do not apply to this case6.
C.

Even if the City was Correct, and the Thirty (30) Day Limitation
Applies to Plaintiffs9 Action, the City Code Makes the Violation at
Issue a Continuing One, Thereby Extending the Thirty (30) Day
Deadline

Section 12.04.090 provides that a violation of the City Code "shall be deemed a
separate offense for each day the violation exists." (R 141). Additionally, Section
12.16.040 requires the City to issue a wiitten stop order whenever it finds construction or
use of property to violate a City ordinance. (R 156). Thus, the City Code unambiguously
directs that a violation of Ordinance 97-7 will be deemed a separate offense for each day
it exists. The City's obligation to issue a written stop order therefore begins anew for
each day the violation exists, and the City is without authority to disregard this
mandatory duty. Springville Citizens, 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332, 337-38
(1999)("Springville Citizens") (Holding City is without authority to derogate from the
terms of its mandatory ordinances).
6

In the event this Court believes Plaintiffs should have attempted to appeal the City's
failure to enforce its ordinances to the City's Board of Adjustment, it should be noted
that Plaintiffs did, in fact, try to appeal the City's inaction to the Board, but the City
refused to convene the Board of Adjustment.
11

If Section 1001 applies to this action, Plaintiffs' challenge was timely because it
was within thirty days of the continuing violation of Ordinance 97-7, and the continuing
failure of the City to issue a written stop order. It was also filed, Plaintiffs believe, before
the issuance of the certificate of occupancy, and was therefore within the limitations
period.
II.

This Court Should Direct the District Court to Grant Summary Judgment in
Favor of Plaintiffs
A.

This Court May Consider Plaintiffs' Substantive Arguments

The City argues that this Court should not consider Plaintiffs' arguments on the
merits because the District Court did not reach such arguments in dismissing Plaintiffs'
Complaint. (City's Brief, 16). The law is well-established that this Court may rule on
any grounds before the District Court, even if it is one not relied upon below. Higgins v.
Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235, 240 (Utah 1993)(Addressing "a question not
reached by the trial court."); Garson v. Garson, 105 A.D.2d 726, 730, 481 N.Y.S.2d 162,
165 (1984)("On review of the denial of plaintiff s motion for summary judgment this
court is empowered to search the record and may instead, if warranted, grant summary
judgment to plaintiffs adversaries."). The City has attempted to distinguish that caselaw
on grounds that this appeal seeks a reversal of the District Court "based on arguments
that were moot below." (City's Brief, 17). This argument ignores the fact that the
District Court's sole basis for holding Plaintiffs' case moot was the application of Section
1001's thirty (30) day limitation to this enforcement action. (R 300. 303-04). Since this

12

holding was in error, it does not constitute sufficient grounds to refuse to consider
Plaintiffs' claims.
All of the facts raised in support of and in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment were before the District Court. (R 99-200, 204-15, 236-56,
320 (3-19)). This Court may therefore consider those arguments and issue a ruling on
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. See Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235; Garson
v. Garson, 105 A.D.2d at 730, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 165. Furthermore, since Plaintiffs' appeal
involves a strict interpretation of the City's ordinances, this Court is in as good a position
as the District Court to render a ruling on the legality of the City's actions. See Toone,
57 P.3d at 1081 ("The proper interpretation of a statute is . . . a question of law, which we
review for correctness."); Springville Citizens, ^ 22, 979 P.2d at 336 (Utah 1999) ("In
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we do not defer to the legal conclusions of the
district court, but review them for correctness."); Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827
P.2d 212, 218 (Utah 1992)("Sandy City") ("Because summary judgment is granted as a
matter of law rather than fact, we are free to reappraise the trial court's legal
conclusions.") Since this Court affords no deference to the District Court on pure issues
of law, it need not wait for the District Court to issue its conclusions prior to considering
the legal issues before it on this appeal.
This Court is also well-equipped to rule on Plaintiffs' Motion since the City is not
entitled to a presumption of validity in this appeal. The City relies on Section 1001 to
argue that if this Court does consider Plaintiffs' challenge, it should presume the City's
13

decision to approve the parking lots in the 1 (30-year flood plain is valid. (City's Brief,
17). However, as this Court has been apprised, the Plaintiffs have alleged the City's
failure to enforce its ordinances is illegal. (See Plaintiffs' Brief, 30-32). Thus, the
presumption afforded to "land use decisions" is not appropriate in this case. This Court is
called upon to determine whether the City complied with its ordinances in failing to take
appropriate enforcement action in response to a violation of Ordinance 97-7. The
interpretation of Ordinance 97-7 and the City Code are pure questions of law. "The
[City's] technical experience in planning and zoning is of no relevance in deciding these
legal issues." Sandy City, 827 P.2d at 218.
B.

The City's Ordinances Prohibit the Location of a Parking Lot in the
100-Year Flood Plain, and Required the City to Issue a Written Stop
Order and Prohibit Issuance of a Certificate of Occupancy to prevent
Construction and Use of the Parking Lot

The City has argued that its ordinances may be read as allowing the parking lots
within the 100-year floodplain, but has failed to rely upon any of its ordinances bearing
on this issue. (City's Brief, 17). Significantly, the City has failed to rely upon its own
definition of "open space" found in the City Code, or its definition set forth in Ordinance
97-7. The City has instead relied upon the Master Development Agreement ("MDA"), a
non-binding agreement between the City and the Developer. (City's Brief, 18: See R
209). Though the Plaintiffs cited the MDA to clarify the permissible uses in the
dedicated open space area, this Court must examine the ordinances themselves to
determine whether the parking lot falls within the City's own definition of "'open space".
See Springville Citizens, ^ 26-30, 979 P.2d at 337-38..
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As explained in detail in Plaintiffs' Brief, the parking lot at issue does not fall
within the City's own definition of "open space" which is defined as "an area preserved
from development of intense urban uses in a natural, landscaped or agrarian state for
recreational or other public purposes." City Code, 12.08.360 (R 254-55; See Plaintiffs'
Brief, 30-33). The parking lot does not fall within the plain meaning of "open space",
"natural", "landscaped", or "agrarian." It is composed primarily of cement, and was
designed and constructed to provide parking for an adjacent, three-story office building.
(R 253-56). As Plaintiffs argued to the District Court, it is hard to imagine a use more
intensely urban than a parking lot constructed to serve an urban office building. (Id.). A s
a matter of law, the construction and use of the River Corridor area as a large parking lot
does not constitute an "open space, recreation or preservation" type use for which the
River Corridor was to be preserved, and is a direct violation of Ordinance 97-7.
Plaintiffs also demonstrated to the trial court that the City's failure to issue a
written stop order requiring the responsible party to cease all use of the Property as a
parking lot was illegal. Section 12.16.040 of the City Code provides: "[if it comes to the
City's] attention that any... construction,... use or contemplated use of land is in violation
of the provisions of [the City's] Zoning Ordinance, [the City] shall issue a written stop
order to the person responsible therefor, ordering and directing such person to cease and
desist such construction, repair or use." (Emphasis added). (R 156). The use of the term
"shall" indicates that issuance of a written stop order is mandatory.
•111 30, 979 P.2d at 337-38.
15

Springville Citizens,

Once the City discovered that the use of the Property was in violation of the City's
Zoning Ordinance, it was not at liberty to allow construction of the parking lot 1o
continue. Id. The City was required by law to issue a written stop order directing the
responsible entity to cease and desist such construction and use. The City's refusal to
issue a written stop order as required by the City Code, or take such other action as was
necessary to bring the Site Plan into compliance with the Code, was therefore illegal as a
matter of law. Id.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court overturn
the District Court's dismissal of this action, and grant Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £?]_ day of March, 2003
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Jeffiy W. jfipp&s
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^Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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